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  CDMA11/08 1 Introduction
The 2007 nancial crisis originated in the United States and was the longest contraction
(measured in months from peak to trough) since the great depression. A feature that
dierentiates the 2007 recession from previous post-war US recessions is the degree to
which it was accompanied by simultaneous downturns in many other other developed
economies. This feature suggests a strong international transmission mechanism of
shocks originating in the banking sector.
Figure 1 shows the response of GDP following the nancial crisis and considers the
path of output relative to its value in 2007 Q4 for three groups of economies: small
open economies with relatively small banking sectors (unexposed sectors), small open
economies with relatively large banking sectors, as well as the remaining G7 economies.
Whereas GDP declined in all countries in our sample, with the exception of Australia,
Figure 1: Output responses during the 2007 US recession





































Quarters after the US peak
2Figure 2: Output contractions during the nancial crisis v foreign asset position of
banks


















































Note: For each country, the cumulative output loss is dened as the percentage dierence between the
peak and the trough of GDP during the nancial crisis.
the magnitude of the contraction diers across the three groups of countries.
In countries with relatively small and domestically focussed banking sectors, as
measured by McGuire and von Peter (2009), such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand
and Norway, the post-2007 downturns tended to be less severe than in the US. In
contrast, countries with large banking sectors and high exposure to foreign assets,
such as the United Kingdom, Ireland, Iceland, and the Netherlands, the spillovers
from the US tended to be more pronounced and often more severe than in the US
itself. Figure 1 suggests a degree of heterogeneity in the international transmission
mechanism across countries.
Figure 2 plots the cumulative output loss during the nancial crisis against the
banking sector's net foreign asset position relative to GDP at the end of 2007. The
solid line in Figure 2 is the implied tted line of the scatter plot and the dashed line
is the the one that emerges if we leave out Ireland from the sample.1 The negative
1Kelly (2010) and Lane (2011) argue strongly that the Irish nancial crisis should be seen as largely
independent of the US nancial crisis and was not triggered by bank losses arising from holdings of
US sub-prime debt, but rather by domestic loan losses.
3correlation suggests that countries with banks that hold large foreign currency asset
positions, are associated with larger output losses during the nancial crisis.
This paper analyses the international transmission mechanism of banking sector
shocks for small open economies with relatively large banks. Our model shows that
spillovers from banking sector shocks are small if home and foreign banks are largely
independent and large if banks in the small country banks intermediate both domestic
as well as a small fraction of foreign country loans.
Modeling nancial intermediation in closed economy DSGE models goes back to at
least to the nancial accelerator model of Bernanke et al. (1999) and more recently to
Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), Nolan and Thoenissen (2009), Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010), Meh and Moran (2010), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Benk et al. (2010) and
Gerali et al. (2010). The literature on nancial intermediation in open economies is
less voluminous. Recent examples of papers looking at the eects of nancial inter-
mediation in open economy DSGE models include Olivero (2010) and Kollmann et al.
(2011).
Our analysis is related to Kollmann et al. (2011) who show that with a fully glob-
alized banking sector, large spillovers are possible form country-specic banking sector
shocks. Our approach diers from theirs in a number of dimensions. First, we focus
not on the spillovers arising from two equally sized economies, but focus instead on the
interactions between a large economy, say the US, on the one hand and a small open
economy, on the other. Second, instead of assuming a fully globalized banking sector,
our focus is on banking sectors that are largely independent. To capture the eects of
large banks in small countries, we allow banks resident in the small country to have
small, but relative to the size of their economy large, exposure to foreign bank assets.
Third, we consider a richer open economy framework, that allows us the analyze both
terms of trade or real exchange rate as well as current account dynamics in response
to banking sector shocks.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 sets out a two-
country business cycle model with nancial intermediation. Section 3 describes the
model's deep parameters and the our estimated driving processes. Section 4 analyses
the model using impulse response analysis as well as second moments generated by the
4model economies. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
At its core, the model is a two-country international business cycle model with ex-
ible prices and wages. Departing from the standard international real business cycle
(IRBC) model, a competitive banking sector that stands in between households and
entrepreneurs is introduced. Households are assumed to be more patient then en-
trepreneurs, ensuring that in steady state, there is demand for both deposits and
loans. In both countries, patient households hold deposits in a global bank that issues
loans to home and foreign banks. Each representative bank combines bank liabilities
with bank capital to make loans to impatient entrepreneurs.
The model is applied to setting where one country is small, relative to the other.
A dening feature of the small economy is that its banking sector is relatively large,
given the relative size of the economy. Banks owned by small-country households make
loans to both domestic and foreign-country entrepreneurs.
The dynamics of the model are driven by shocks to total factor productivity in the
goods producing sector and shocks that redistribute income between entrepreneurs and
banks. Shocks occur in both countries. Throughout the home economy
2.1 Households
We propose a two-country model with innitely lived consumers. The world economy
is populated by a continuum of agents on the interval [0, 1]. The population on the
segment [0, n) belongs to the home country, while the segment [n, 1] belongs to foreign
country. The representative agent in both countries smooths consumption over time
by purchasing deposits issued in units of foreign currency with a one period return of
rd
t . The representative household receives wage income, wtlt, as well as dividends, Tt,
from owning domestic nal goods producers as well as the domestic banking sector.
Equation (1) shows the budget constraint for the representative household in the
home country.
Ptct + dtSt = Ptwtlt + (1 + rd
t 1)dt 1St + Tt + tE
t (1)
5Pt denotes the price of the domestic consumption good. The nal consumption good,
ct, is a CES aggregate of home and foreign-produced nal goods. St denotes the
nominal exchange rate, dened as the home-currency price of unit of foreign currency.
Throughout the paper, we assume that the agent's decision on how much to save or
dis-save in period t depends on the interest rate available in the spot market on savings
(deposits) in period t. (1 + rt) is the total nominal return to one unit of savings held
in the form of deposits between periods t and t + 1.
The standard rst-order conditions arising from maximizing expected intertempo-
ral welfare, dened over consumption and labour are:
Uc(ct;lt) = t (2)
Ul(ct;lt) = twt (3)







An analogous constraint and set of optimality conditions characterize the foreign-
country household's decision problem.
2.2 International Risk-sharing
The consumption-based real exchange rate deviates from purchasing power parity be-




Pt are related to movements in the relative marginal utilities of consumption











2.3 Final goods producers
Final goods, y, are produced using capital, rented from the entrepreneur, and labour.
Final goods are used for both consumption and investment in both the home and the
foreign economy. PH is the price of the home-produced traded good. Prots of the





yt   wtlt   tkt (6)




As the goods producer is owned by the household, future prots are discounted by
the representative household's stochastic discount factor. The maximisation problem










t = t (9)
The foreign-country nal goods producer faces an analogous optimization problem.
2.4 Banks
Apart from the goods producer, the representative agent also owns the banking system.
Home and foreign banks both raise deposits from the global bank. The foreign bank,
resident in the large economy, only advances loans to foreign-country entrepreneurs.
Home-country banks, on the other hand, make loans to entrepreneurs in both countries.
Our model of nancial intermediation follows the wholesale banks set up in Gerali
et al. (2010). The prot function of the home bank, denominated in units of domestic
currency per capita, is characterized as follows:
B
t = (1 + r
q




























Each period, the bank makes loans to home entrepreneurs, qt. Home-country banks
also intermediate a fraction,  of the foreign country's total loans. We are at this stage
abstracting from the reasons why the home banking sector is active in the foreign
market, and assume simply that home country banks intermediate a fraction  of
foreign loans. As B
t are bank prots per capita, and q are foreign per capita loans,
we adjust lending to foreign rms by the relative size of the foreign country in term
so of the home country. As the home country is assumed to be small relative to the
foreign country, home banks take the interest rate on loans prevailing in the foreign
7country as given, such that r
q
t is the interest on loans faced by foreign entrepreneurs.
Following Kollmann et al. (2011), we assume that each period only a fraction t of
one-period loans advanced in the previous period is repaid with interest. Bank prots
are adversely aected if the realized repayment rate falls below that expected at the
time the loan was made. As the home-country bank makes loans at home as well as
abroad, shocks to the foreign repayment rate have a direct aect on bank prots.
Banks are funded via liabilities obtained from the `global' bank. Bank liabilities,
Dt are denominated in foreign currency. The interest rate payable on liabilities is the
interest rate on deposits available to the representative consumer
Banks face a balance sheet constraint that requires total lending to be backed by
borrowed liabilities as well as banks' own capital stock:
Qt = DtSt + KB
t (11)
where total lending is denoted: Qt = qt+Stq









Each period, the nancial intermediary distributes a constant fraction (1   !) of prots
(B
t ) to shareholders while using the remainder to augment the bank's own capital
stock. B captures the costs to the bank of managing the bank's capital stock.
Deviations from a prescribed bank capital-to-loans ratio, z, are costly. One can
rationalize such a cost by assuming that adjusting the bank's capital position is costly.
Kollmann et al. (2011) motivate a similar cost by the need for "creative accounting"
should the bank capital-to-loans ratio fall below the prescribed level.
The optimization problem of the banking sector, using the owner's stochastic dis-





























The discounted real interest rate spread between bank loans and liabilities is driven by
the evolution of the bank capital-to-loans ratio. A ratio above z reduces the spread,
8whereas a ratio below z raises the spread. 2 In setting the interest rate on loans, the
bank takes in to account the expected re-payment rate (implicitly the default rate)
in the period when the loan is due to be repaid. Because the bank makes loans to
entrepreneurs in both countries, unanticipated shocks to the repayment rates in both
countries (  and ) aect the interest rate spread faced by domestic entrepreneurs.
An unanticipated decline in t raises (1+r
q
t) directly. By leading to a loss for the bank,
equation (10), a decline in t reduces the bank's capital stock. For a given level of total
bank lending, the intermediation margin will have to rise to generate bank prots with
which to rebuild the bank's capital stock. When there is a negative repayment shock on
lending to foreign entrepreneurs, the domestic spread rises due to resulting reduction
in bank prots.
2.5 Impatient entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs produce capital goods that are rented out to nal goods producers.
Entrepreneurs dier from households with respect to their subjective rate of time pref-
erence, they are assumed to be less patient than households. The relative impatience of
entrepreneurs ensures that in the steady state, we have both borrowing and lending.3






dened only over consumption, subject to the following budget, capital accumulation
and borrowing constraints:
cE
t = tkt   xt +
qt
Pt


























































3An alternative to this assumption would be to create a demand for deposits and thus loans by








= Et't+1kt+1(1   ) (17)
Where  is the rental rate of capital paid by the good producer, qt are new loans from
the banking sector, (1+r
q
t 1)t is the fraction of the interest rate payable plus the prin-
ciple of last period's loans that are repaid. As in Kollmann et al. (2011), the repayment
shock represents a transfer between entrepreneurs and banks. In order to rule out that
entrepreneurs benet directly from a negative shock to , we introduce a transfer, tE,
from the entrepreneur to the owners of the bank that prevents entrepreneurial con-
sumption from rising when  declines. This shock only aects the real economy via its
eects on the bank's capital position.4
s(:) captures investment adjustment costs as proposed by Christiano et al (2005),
' denotes the price of capital and  the loan-to-valuation ratio constraining en-
trepreneurial borrowing. At time t, lending to entrepreneurs is constrained to a frac-
tion, , of the discounted market price of next period's un-depreciated capital stock.
The entrepreneur's maximisation problem yields the following optimality conditions
for entrepreneurial consumption, borrowing, investment as well as next period's desired
capital stock:
Uc(cE




















































(t+1 + 't+1 f(1   )g) = 't   Et't+1t(1   ) (21)
t is the Lagrange multiplier on the entrepreneur's borrowing constraint. If t = 0
and the constraint is non binding, then the entrepreneur behaves in exactly the same
4The redistributive shock, , is a proxy for default and as such there should not be a welfare gain
associated with default for the entrepreneur. Because the entrepreneur is borrowing constrained, a
negative shock to  will raise entrepreneurial consumption by more than it reduces consumption of
bank's owners, hence the need for the transfer payment.
10manner as the household.5
An analogous set of constraints and rst-order conditions apply to the foreign
economy's entrepreneurial sector.
2.6 Small open economy as a limiting case of a two country model
The relative size of the home economy, n, is small. Sutherland (2005) shows a simple
way to nest a small open economy model as a special case of a two-country model. Total
consumption in both countries is dened as the sum of household and entrepreneurial
consumption:
cT = c + cE (22)
Total consumption in the home country is dened as a constant elasticity of substitu-

















where CH and CF are home and foreign produced consumption goods, respectively. 
is the elasticity of substitution between these two types of goods. Sutherland (2005)
links the share of home-produced goods in home total consumption v to the relative
size of the country and its openness to trade, :
1   v = (1   n)
v = 1   (1   n)
The share of home-produced goods in foreign total consumption, v becomes:
v = n
1   v = 1   n
In the limit, when n approaches zero the share of home-produced goods in foreign
consumption tends to zero, v = 0, and foreign economy behaves just like a closed
economy. In the home economy, the share of home-produced goods in total consump-
tion, v, becomes a function of the degree of openness of the home economy, v = 1 .
5 is, however, only zero if the entrepreneur is as patient as the household. In the steady state,
where there there is no spread between deposits and loans,  =    
E.
11Two important relative prices in any IRBC model are the terms of trade, dened as the
price of imports relative to exports, T = PF
SP




In linearized form, these two relative prices (from the home country's perspective) are
related by the degree of openness to trade
^ RSt = (1   )^ Tt (24)
2.7 Consolidated budget constraint
The dynamics of the net foreign asset position of the domestic economy are derived by
consolidating to household's and the entrepreneur's budget constraints. The patient
household owns both the nal goods producer and the bank and receives any residual
prots from these two sectors. Adding the entrepreneur's constraint to the household's
consolidated budget constraint yields:
PtcT






























where the net foreign asset position, Bt =
 
dt + 1 n
n qt   Dt

is the dierence between
domestically held assets (agent's deposits with the global bank plus the value of over-
seas banking assets) and the home bank's borrowing from the global bank, determines
the home country's net foreign asset position.6 The management cost of bank capital,
BKB
t 1 is a net resource cost to the economy.
2.8 Closing the model
We have assumed that agents accumulate deposits denominated in units of foreign-
country currency. As a result, we have written down what is essentially a nominal
model. It is straight forward to convert the model into a canonical international real
business cycle model by assuming that the monetary authority follows a strict policy
of setting producer price ination to zero. As there are no nominal rigidities, this can
be achieved at all times.










t , as a tax on banks that gets
rebated to representative consumer and thus does not represent a resource cost to the economy.
123 Calibration
The two countries in our calibration exercise are the United Kingdom as the small
home economy and the United States as the large foreign economy. The relative size
of the home economy, n, is calibrated as the size of the United Kingdom economy
relative to that of the rest of world.7
Table 1 reports the initial calibrated parameters. Throughout, the unit of time is
one quarter. The discount factor for patient households is set to 0.99, implying an
annual interest rates on deposits held with the global bank of 4% in both countries.
Impatient entrepreneurs discount future income streams at an annualized rate of 6%.











and posit a log-utility function in consumption and labour by setting  =  = 1.
The calibration sets the the share of home-produced intermediate goods in total
consumption and investment to 0.75 to match the average share of imports in the UK
over our sample period. Given the relative size of the UK, this implies an openness
parameter,  of 0.26. Initially, the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign-produced intermediate goods both in consumption and investment,
is set to 1.
In the production function, the elasticity of output to capital is set to 0.25 while the
depreciation rate is set to 0.025, its standard value in the literature. Initially for our
analysis of impulse responses, the value of the investment adjustment cost parameter
is set to zero. Below, we choose slightly dierent values of the parameter in order
to match the observed relative volatility of investment in both the UK and the US.
Impatient entrepreneur's borrowing is constrained by a loan-to-valuation ratio,  of
0.70, a value suggested by Gerali et al. (2010)
Calibrating the deep parameters of the nancial intermediaries in our model, we
use US data on total equity to total assets ratio of commercial banks to calibrate the
steady state bank capital-to-loan ratio. Accordingly, the parameter v is set to 10%,
7An alternative would have been to set the relative size of the small country as the UK's GDP
relative to the US. This would, however, overstate the relative importance of UK shocks on the rest
of the world.
13Table 1: Initial calibration
Parameter Description UK US
(if dierent)
 Discount factor HHs 0.9901
E Discount factor E 0.9852
 Elasticity of intertemp. substitution (HH) 1
E Elasticity of intertemp. substitution (E) 1
 Inverse of Frisch elasticity 1
 CES btw home and foreign goods 1
v Home-bias in consumption and investment 0.75
 Depreciation rate 0.025
s00 Investment adjustment costs 0
 Elasticity of spread to capital to loan ratio 10
z Steady state capital to loan ratio 0.1
! Bank's dividend policy 0.5
b Bank capital depreciation rate 0.005
 UK banks' share of US lending 0.04
n Relative country size 0.04 0.96
A Persistence: Technology shock 0.8669 0.8615
A Standard deviation: Technology shock 0.0053 0.0056
 Persistence : Write-o shock 0.7314 0.9582
 Standard deviation : Write-o shock 0.0002 0.0004
Corr(A,) 0.28 0.18
its mean value over 1988-2010 period. Following Gerali et al. (2010), we set  to 10 in
our baseline calibration, and check the sensitivity our results to various values of this
parameter. Finally we assume that 50% of bank prots are reinvested in bank capital
and set ! to 0.5. The value of b is derived from the steady state relationships and
equals 0.005 implying that the bank capital depreciates in an annual rate of roughly
2%.
The dynamics of the model are driven by country specic exogenous shocks to total
factor productivity (TFP) and the repayment rate on bank loans. These exogenous
variables are all assumed to follow AR(1) processes. Table 1 reports the AR(1) coef-
cients, the standard errors of the innovations as well as the correlation coecients
between domestic repayment and TFP shocks. The data appendix describes the data
used to create these shock processes.
14The main motivation of the paper is to investigate the role of nancial interme-
diation on the international transmission of shocks. Therefore we abstract from the
cross-country correlation of the shocks processes and focus on the endogenous propa-
gation mechanisms originating from the presence of the nancial intermediation.
4 International transmission mechanism
This section addresses three issues. First, how does the addition of a banking sector
into a canonical international business cycle model aects the transmission of produc-
tivity shocks? Second, how do repayment, or default, shocks transmit between open
economies? Finally, how is this transmission mechanism altered if the small country
has relatively large banks?
To address these issues, we initially consider impulse responses to real and nancial
shocks originating in the large economy and discuss how macroeconomic variables
respond to these shocks. We then analyze the statistical properties of the model in
order to assess its ability to match a selection of second moments of US and UK data.
4.1 Impulse response analysis
The solid lines in Figures 3 - 9 show the response of home-country (the small open
economy) variables and the dashed lines show those of the foreign economy. Figure
3 shows the response of selected variables to a negative unit TFP shock located in
the foreign economy. This analysis helps to illustrate the role of banks in our model
economy. As output and investment demand falls in foreign economy, so does the
demand for bank loans. For a given stock of bank capital, the decline in bank lending
also lowers the bank spread, i.e. the dierence between the interest rate on bank loans,
rq versus bank liabilities, rd. Foreign shocks are transmitted to the home economy
via changes in the terms of trade, which via equation (24) is a linear function of the
real exchange rate. In Figure 3, the home country real exchange rate depreciates and
acts to share consumption risk between the home and foreign country. As a result
there is a modest decline in the components of domestic GDP.
Figure 4 repeats the exercise of Figure 3 for the case in which the bank faces no
15Figure 3: Impulse responses to a unit TFP shock in the foreign country













































cost associated with changing the bank capital-to-loans ratio ( = 0) . Apart from the
behaviour of the interest rate spread, the two models are virtually identical, implying
only a modest eect of adding a nancial sector into an IRBC model.8 As in Kollmann
et al. (2011) and Gerali et al. (2010), the eects of banks on the transmission of supply
shocks is modest and the bank spread is pro-cyclical following a supply shock. This
suggests that in order to generate a data congruent counter-cyclical spread, the model
needs to be augmented by shocks originating in the nancial sector.
Figure 5 shows impulse responses to an unexpected, one-o reduction of , the
foreign loan repayment rate, for the special case in which home-country banks do
not advance loans to foreign rms ( = 0). A negative shock to the loan repayment
rate in our model, is a transfer from the banking sector to entrepreneurs. To avoid
entrepreneurial consumption rising in response to such a shock, entrepreneurs are
8To some extent this due to our calibration. Using larger values of to the steady state bank equity-
to-loans ratio, v or increasing the bank's interest rate response to changes in the bank equity to loan
ratio,  yield more substantive dierences between the two models, at the expense of an unrealistic
set of parameter choices.
16Figure 4: Impulse responses to a unit TFP shock in the foreign country - no banking
sector










































taxed and proceeds rebated to the owners of the bank. Nonetheless, bank prots and
therefore bank capital accumulation are adversely aected by the shock. The spread
rises for two reasons: rst, to take into account the expected path of the repayment
rate, and second because of a decline in the bank capital stock. The decline in output
and bank lending in the foreign economy is due only to that part of the increase in
the spread caused by the decline in bank capital.9 The components of foreign GDP do
not, however, all move in the same direction. There is a notable decline in investment
as well as arise in consumption. A similar counter-cyclical response of consumption is
also found in response to investment specic technology shocks (Basu and Thoenissen
(2011), Justiniano et al. (2011) ) and in response to entrepreneurial net worth shocks
in nancial accelerator models (Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) and Nolan and Thoenissen
(2009)).
9If deviations in bank capital have no eect on the spread, i.e. if  = 0, a "default" shock would
only eect (1 + r
q




t+1 unchanged. There would therefore be no
eect on the real economy.
17The international spillovers of repayment, or default shocks to our small economy
are modest. Figure 5 suggests a very small initial decline in home GDP associated with
a persistently worsening net foreign asset position. The initial response of the home-
country's real exchange rate (terms of trade) is to appreciate followed by a protracted
depreciation. Just as with TFP shocks, the movements in the real exchange rate
largely insulate the home economy against the eects of a foreign banking sector shock.
Interestingly, home-country banking variables such as the spread, bank lending or the
bank capital stock are also virtually unaected by a foreign default shock.
The role of the real exchange rate movements in insulating the home economy from
foreign banking shocks is highlighted in Figure 6 where the small economy is assumed
to be completely open to trade, i.e.  = 1 such that purchasing power parity holds
at all time. In this case, the risk sharing condition, equation (5), implies a tight link
between home and foreign consumption. Under this calibration, home output declines
by almost as much as foreign output.
In order to capture the synchronized downturns observed in the US and most other
OECD countries, one needs to account for the degree of international integration in
the banking sector. Kollmann et al. (2011) propose a global banking sector, where
one bank essentially does all the intermediation in both countries. A default shock
in either economy leads to a decline in bank capital and thus to an equal size rise in
the spread in both countries. Instead of assuming a fully integrated banking sector,
we consider the case where the banking sector in the small country is relatively large
and where home-country banks intermediate a small (but compared to home-country
output, relatively large) fraction of foreign-country loans. Foreign banks only lend
to foreign entrepreneurs, but home-country banks can lend to both home and foreign
entrepreneurs.
In Figure 7 the small economy consists of 4% of world households. Banks resident
in the home country intermediate all home country loans as well as 4% of foreign loans.
Under this calibration, we get a signicant decline in home-country output following a
default shock by foreign entrepreneurs. Home output declines by about half as much as
foreign output. A default by foreign entrepreneurs adversely aects home-country bank
prots, reducing bank capital and therefore raising the intermediation margin faced by
18Figure 5: Impulse responses to a unit decline in the foreign repayment rate - no foreign
lending











































domestic rms. Allowing home country banks to be exposed to foreign lending greatly
increases correlation between home and foreign output following foreign banking sector
shocks.
Figures 8 and 9 explore the transmission of foreign default shock when allowing for
further heterogeneity between the home and foreign banking sectors. In Figure 8, the
banks in the home country maintain a higher bank capital-to-loans ratio, v, than do
foreign banks. Paradoxically, maintaining a higher bank capital stock implies a larger
increase in the home-country spread and subsequent larger decline in home-country
investment and GDP.
In Figure 9, banks in the home country face a higher cost of deviating from the
target bank capital-to-loan ratio,  than do foreign banks. A higher  is associated
with a more volatile interest rate spread, which increases the degree to which foreign
repayment or default shocks spillover to the home economy.
19Figure 6: Impulse responses to a unit decline in the foreign repayment rate - no
consumption home-bias











































The focus of this section has been on shocks originating in the foreign (large)
economy. In summarizing our results so far, we nd the following: The existence of
banks per se does not signicantly alter the transmission mechanism of productivity
shocks, hence `normal' recessions, are not amplied or dampened by the existence of
banks in our model. For shocks originating in the banking sector, the international
transmission mechanism depends on the degree of exposure of home banks to foreign
loans. Spillovers are modest if home country banks are not directly exposed to foreign
loans. In this case, movements in the terms of trade are sucient to insulate the
home economy from the foreign shock. When domestic banks undertake nancial
intermediation in both the home and the foreign market, a default shock on foreign
loans adversely aects the capital position of domestic banks. The result is a rise in
the intermediation margin on loans to domestic rms as banks attempt to increase
prots with which to re-build their capital stock. A rise in the borrowing rate brings
20Figure 7: Impulse responses to a unit decline in the foreign repayment rate - foreign
lending ( = n)










































about a recession by reducing investment and output.
4.2 Second moments
Table 2 compares the business cycle properties of the model economy to US and UK
data. In terms of business cycle properties of GDP and its components, the UK is very
similar to the US. Bank lending, measured as M4 lending to PNFCs in the UK and
loans and leases in bank credit in the US, is more volatile in the UK than in the US.
Bank spreads, dened as the dierence between corporate and government bond yields
in the UK, and in the US is also more volatile in the UK than in the US. Whereas
bank lending is pro-cyclical, the spread, or intermediation margin, is counter-cyclical
in both countries.10
The shocks driving the model are country specic. The UK total factor productivity
shock, dened as the Solow residual, has very similar characteristics to its US counter
10See the data appendix for detailed data sources.
21Figure 8: Impulse responses to a unit drop in the foreign repayment rate - foreign
lending ( = n) and higher target bank capital-to-loans ratio in the home economy (v
= 0.15)








































part. Table 1 suggests very similar AR(1) coecients and standard deviation for the
two TFP shocks. Our calculations suggest that the US default rate is both more
volatile and more persistent than its UK counter part. The data suggests that in
both countries default (loan repayment rate) and productivity shocks are negatively
(positively) correlated.
Given the estimated shock processes, we calibrate the adjustment cost parameter,
s00 in each country to match the relative standard deviation of investment. For the UK,
a value of 0.78 and for the US a value of 0.41 allows the model to match the standard
deviation of investment relative to GDP. As in Thoenissen (2011), we use the elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign-produceced goods, , to match the relative
standard deviation of the UK terms of trade. Setting  = 0:605 allows us to match
the standard deviation of the UK's terms of trade relative to UK GDP.11
11This value of  is below the usual value of 1 - 1.5 used in the literature, but is still in the range for
22Figure 9: Impulse responses to a unit decline in the foreign repayment rate - foreign
lending ( = n) and higher cost of deviating from the target bank capital-to-loans ratio
in the home economy ( = 40)













































The columns headed TFP + def report selected second moments for the large (US)
and the small open economy (UK) driven by both TFP and \default" shocks. With
these shocks, the model captures about 80% and 60% of the volatility of US and UK
GDP, respectively. Whereas the model matches the relative volatility of investment
exactly, it under-predicts the volatility of consumption. For the the large economy, the
model captures most of the relative volatility of the bank spread, but for both sets of
economies fails to match the volatility of bank lending.
A key feature of the data is the counter-cyclical bank spread. When driven by
both TFP and default shocks, our model generates counter-cyclical spreads for both
the large and the small economy. As in the data, the US bank spread is somewhat
more counter-cyclical than the UK one. Bank lending is pro-cyclical in the data and in
which the model generates a \standard" transmission mechanism of productivity shocks, as opposed
to \negative" transmission as highlighted by Corsetti et al. (2008).
23the models. Finally, the correlations of the UK's terms of trade and net trade, relative
to UK GDP are of the correct sign.
The column headed \Def" reports second moments generated by our model when
driven only by \default" shocks. Default shocks alone explain less than 1% of the
volatility of GDP, but account for most of the variation in the bank lending as well
as the interest rate spread. Crucially, the default shocks account for the counter-
cyclicality of the bank spread.
The column headed \Def  = 0" repeats the default-shock-only simulation for the
case where UK banks do not intermediate US loans. The key dierence between the
two simulations is the correlation between home and foreign GDP. Whereas the GDP
in the small and the large country are highly correlated under default shocks if the
small open economy is exposed loans written in the large economy, the correlation is
close to zero when home and foreign banks are entirely separate. Figure 10 reports
sensitivity analysis around the parameter  and shows the correlation between home
and foreign GDP rising rapidly as the share of foreign bank assets in the small open
economy rises. As in Figure 2, the correlation between home and foreign (US) GDP
following default shocks is larger the greater is the ratio of foreign banking assets to
GDP in the small country.
The nal column of Table 2 conrms the high correlation between outputs in the
absence of consumption home-bias.
24Figure 10: Sensitivity analysis: correlation between home and foreign GDP under
default shocks for various values of domestic exposure to foreign banking shocks: 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Including a banking sector into an otherwise standard international real business cycle
model does not signicantly alter the transmission mechanism of productivity shocks.
Movements in the real exchange rate insulate the home economy from foreign shocks. A
default shock that adversely aects the foreign bank's capital position results in a real
appreciation of the home country's real exchange rate. Whereas foreign GDP declines,
home GDP remains largely unaected by a foreign banking sector shock. When we
allow the home country's banks to intermediate a small proportion of foreign bank
lending, a foreign-country default shock has a signicant negative eect on home-
country GDP.
Our ndings suggest that small open economies with large and internationally ex-
posed banking sectors are more aected by foreign banking sector shocks than countries
with relatively self contained banking sectors. The response to foreign supply shocks
does not appear to be aected by the structure of the banking sector.
Appendix
A Data sources and denition
GDP data in Figure 1 and Figure 2 is taken from HAVER and refers to seasonally ad-
justed quarterly GDP in constant prices in national currencies. The following countries
are included in the graphs: Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain
and the United Kingdom. In gure 1, the GDP of each country is normalized to 100
at 2007:Q4.
In Figure 3, data on foreign claims over GDP for 2007 is taken from McGuire
and von Peter (2009). In these calculations, foreign claims for a particular banking
system is the claims booked by all worldwide operations of banks headquartered in
that country. As a result this measure does not include positions booked by foreign
banks located in that particular country, and exclude the positions of the foreign oces
that particular country's banks.
Unless otherwise indicated, the business cycle moments are calculated over the
27period 1987Q1:2009Q4. In Table 2, US GDP, consumption and investment refer to
seasonally adjusted real per capita series. GDP is from BEA's NIPA table 7.1, \Se-
lected Per Capita Product and Income Series in Current and Chained Dollar". Con-
sumption is from BEA's NIPA Table 2.3.5 , "Personal Consumption Expenditures"
and deated by the relevant GDP deator from BEA's NIPA table 1.1.9. Investment
is "Real Private Fixed Investment " from BEA's NIPA table 5.3.3. Data on loans
are from the Federal Reserve Board (Table H.8, Assets and Liabilities of Commercial
Banks in the United States) and corresponds to "Break-Adjusted Loans and Leases in
Bank Credit" for all commercial banks that we deate using the GDP deator. We
convert consumption, investment and loans in per capita terms by dividing each series
by population which is from BEA's NIPA table 7.1.
Data for UK are from Oce for National Statistics. GDP is Gross Domestic Prod-
uct, consumption is consumption by households and general government and invest-
ment is gross xed capital formation respectively (all from natpc2 dataset). We con-
vert these series in per capita terms by dividing each series by population (lmsum01
dataset). The terms of trade for UK is dened as the ratio of import price deator
over export price deator. Import (export) price deator is calculated by dividing im-
ports (exports) at current prices by imports (exports) at constant prices (natpc1 and
natpc2 datasets ). Net trade is from Haver and corresponds to "Balance on Current
Account as a percentage of GDP". Our measure of loans is from the Bank of England
and refers to seasonally adjusted "Quarterly amounts outstanding of monetary nan-
cial institutions' sterling net lending excluding securitisations to private non-nancial
corporations" which we convert to real per capita terms by dividing it by the GDP
deator and population.
Our measure of interest rate spreads for both, UK and US, is from Datastream
and is quarterly average of monthly dierences between corporate (USACRPB and
UKMCRPB) and government (USAGLTB, UKMGLTB) bond yields.
Data for exogenous processes
The total factor productivity (TFP) processes for both, US and UK, are constructed
as a residual using the production function presented in the text. For US, capital is
private xed assets from BEA's NIPa table 5.9 and labor is hours of all persons in the
28nonfarm business sector from Bureau of Labor Statistics. For UK, capital and labor
are from ONS and correspond to "Gross Capital Stock" (ZLDO) and "Total actual
weekly hours worked" (YBUS) from ONS. For both, US and UK, the capital stock
is extrapolated from annual to quarterly frequency using quarterly investment data.
We then assume that the percentage deviations of TFP from a trend follow an AR(1)
process and estimate the following equation for US and UK on linearly detrended TFP
:
b At = A b At 1 + A (27)
The default rate for US is from HAVER and refers to "loan delinquency rate on com-
mercial and industrial loans" for all insured commercial banks. We calculate the default
rate for UK as a ratio of Quarterly amounts UK resident monetary nancial institu-
tions' sterling write-os of lending to private non-nancial corporations" (RPQTFHB)
and total loans which is dened above. As for the total factor productivity, we assume
that the exogenous repayment process in our model corresponds to deviations of the
default rate from a trend. We estimate the following AR(1) process for US and UK
on HP ltered default rates:
b t = b t 1 +  (28)
Given the recent nancial crisis and the possible increase in the volatility of the shock
processes, we calculate the standard deviations of the exogenous driving processes
using data up to the end of 2007.
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